A lack of fire breaks along state highways allowed the Hanford fire in June to spread quickly, burning across nearly 300 square miles, according to the Department of Energy's investigation of the fire.

The report, released Tuesday, detailed a long list of recommended changes to allow Hanford employees to better respond to future fires. They ranged from improving fire breaks to better maps available to track the fire to better crowd control after people on Highway 240 waved instruments and told firefighters they were exposed to radiation.

However, the report found "no smoking gun," said Keith Benguiat, division director of engineering, safety and standards at DOE's Richland office.

"There were no findings that concern lack of performance of the organization," he said. "There were no incidents of misdirecting people. As fast as you could get people, we deployed them. We did what we could with the resources that were available."

Changes and improvements recommended in the report likely wouldn't have altered the outcome of the fire, said Paul Kruger, acting deputy Hanford manager for site transition.

Even better firebreaks along highways might not have stopped the fire, Benguiat said. The fire, which began after a fatal accident June 27 on Highway 24, sent flying debris across the far side of the roadway, lighting fires on both sides of the road.

Once the fire reached full force, it was powerful enough to jump the Yakima River. Even with larger fire breaks, the highways likely wouldn't have held the fire, Hanford officials said.

However, in the past, fire breaks along the highways have been maintained. After a 1984 Hanford lightning fire burned 200,000 acres, firebreaks were cut until 1995 by disking along highways 24 and 240 rights of way.

After a complaint about blowing dust that year, DOE stopped disking. Instead, tumbleweeds that piled up nearly as high as the fences along the highways were burned. Tighter restrictions on open burning stopped that practice before the June fire.

The report also detailed potential problems caused by fear of radiation contamination on the Hanford nuclear reservation and called for a better process for using outside firefighters on the site.

Non-Hanford commanders at the fire initially refused to allow outside firefighters onto the site, fearing mass radioactive contamination. That order stood for six hours, until the Hanford Fire Department chief was able to convince other commanders that firefighters would be safe. He provided reports showing dangerous areas were located and marked, according to the report.

Because the fire was being fought then on uncontaminated land of the Hanford Reach National Monument, the six-hour delay did not significantly affect firefighting on the Hanford site, according to the report.

Pilots who flew airdrops also said they were concerned about being exposed to radiation while flying through the fire and smoke. Other firefighters were anxious after unidentified groups of people who approached them on Highway 240, waved instruments and said firefighters had been exposed to radiation.

DOE has said firefighters on the nuclear site were not exposed to detectable levels of radiation, based on preliminary results of urine tests.

However, this and other reports have said the fire was so large and fast that firefighters and police officers were in danger at times.

The report released Tuesday concluded that in one incident, a Hanford patrolman was sent into the path of the fire because the Hanford Patrol Operation Center didn't know where the fire was burning. The patrolman had been sent to check a gate at Rattlesnake Mountain when the fire crested the rise to his north.

"Available mapping resources for emergency response did not provide information that could be used to effectively fight the fire, provide patrol response or give understandable information to the public," the report concluded.

A global positioning system might help improve coordination at future fires, the report said.

The report also called for improved agreements with other agencies.

In previous fires, helicopters from the Yakima Training Center had been used at Hanford. However, no formal agreement exists between Hanford and the training center, and about two hours were spent trying to arrange for a helicopter in the early hours of this summer's fire, the report found.

No helicopter was sent. But Benguiat said that was not because of lack of an agreement, but because they were needed at the training center. The center was conducting a field exercise and was required to have the helicopters on hand for medical evacuations, Benguiat said.

Other recommendations in the report called for improving emergency communications - including less reliance on overburdened cell phone systems - and improving emergency response processes when other state and federal agencies are involved.

"This will not be the last fire we have to fight at Hanford, and I expect our emergency managers to use this report to make us even better prepared for the future," said Keith Klein, DOE's Hanford manager.

"While we have found numerous areas where we can make improvements, the overall fire response successfully prevented serious injury or loss of major structures on the Hanford site and protected the public and the environment," he said.

The report is posted on the Internet at www.hanford.gov/hanfordfire.html